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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 59-1-602 for two reasons. First, under section 59-1-
602( l)(a), the Petitioners are aggrieved parties that appeared before the Utah State 
Tax Commission and now appeal the Commission's decision. The Commission's 
Decision is included as Exhibit 1. 
And second, under section 59-l-602(l)(b), Wasatch County, Cross-
Petitioner, has had its tax revenues affected by the Commission's decision and is a 
"party in interest in the proceeding before the court." The Utah Supreme Court 
also has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Section 63G-4-403(l) 
because this is a review of the Commission's "final action resulting from [its] 
formal adjudicative proceedings." The Supreme Court poured this appeal over to 
this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
Court now has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Issues: 
1. Whether Petitioners' appeal constitutes a challenge to the 
Utah State Tax Commission's findings of fact and should therefore be barred for 
the failure to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's findings? 
2. Whether the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission") 
properly rejected Petitioners' request to allocate value to Petitioners' one-acre 
1 
home sites using the indiscriminate, pro rata methodology in favor of applying an 
allocation methodology that recognizes the true value of the one-acre home sites? 
3. Whether the Commission's application of 65% of the value of 
the Petitioners' entire 160-acre lots1 to the ten-acre building envelopes within 
those lots—instead of to the one-acre home sites within those ten-acre building 
envelopes as recommended by Wasatch County's expert Mr. Blaine Hales—is 
supported by substantial evidence? 
B. Evidence that the Issues were Preserved in the Formal Agency 
Adjudication: 
In relation to the abovementioned issues of factual finding, Wasatch 
County responds to the Petitioner's appeal, and presents its own cross-appeal, by 
citing to the following formal adjudicative determinations: 
Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold 
separately from the 159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair 
market value to the one-acre based on the express language of the FAA. . . . 
Absent evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in 
value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales conclusion that 65% of the value 
of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land 
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is 
ten-acres. 
1
 Of the seven properties owned by Petitioners, six are 160-acres in size; one—that 
of Michael Sulh\an—is 184 acres. Record at 55-56; Exhibit 1 pp. 2-3. For ease 
of reference throughout this brief, the lots will be referred to as 160-acre lots. 
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Record at 064, Exhibit 1, p. 11. 
Although the one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately, Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair market value 
and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site 
used in connection with greenbelt property. 
Record at 069; Exhibit 1, p. 16 
Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the analysis to 
the one-acre [home sites], because the entire 10 acres is developable with 
the possibility of a second home, garages, barns,. . . and so forth,... the 
Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the 
contrary, Mr Hales' analysis adequately supports that 65% of the value is 
attnbutable to the [ten-acre] buildable envelope for these properties. 
Record at 070; Exhibit 1, p 17. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A Issue #1 
The first issue presents an issue of law Whether an issue is one of fact or 
one of law is, itself, an issue of law In Alta Pacific v Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy 
discussion, among multiple opinions, regarding whether a particular aspect of a 
valuation methodology constituted an issue of fact or of law The Court ended up 
holding—the concurrences outnumbenng the lead opinion on this point—that the 
valuation methodology presented an issue of law Id. at 120 (concurrence of 
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Mclff, District Judge); see also Id. at 117 (concurrence of C J. Zimmerman). If 
this Court finds that the method of allocation involves a question of fact, the Court 
may decline to reach the arguments in Petitioners' appeal for failing to marshal the 
evidence. Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n9 1999 UT 48, ^ 7, 980 P.2d 690, 
692 (internal quotations omitted) ("a party challenging the Commission's factual 
findings bears the burden of marshaling all evidence supporting the findings and 
showing that the evidence is insufficient"). 
B. Issue #2 
As argued in the body of this brief addressing Issue #1, the standard of 
review for the second issue—the rejection of Petitioners' proposed pro rata 
methodology—is an issue of fact. The choice of valuation methodology usually 
presents an issue of fact. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 7z, 916 P.2d 344, 
355 (Utah 1996) ( "the choice of valuation methodology used in fixing the value 
of a property is a question of fact"). When reviewing questions of fact, this Court 
"shall grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, 
applying a substantial evidence standard on review." § 59-l-610(l)(a); Exhibit 2, 
P. i. 
Petitioners, of course, assert that the issue is solely one of law. There is 
some precedent for the assertion that an appraisal methodology can sometimes 
present an issue of law. In Aha Pacific Associates, a divided court held that issues 
involving valuation methodologies are issues of law only when examining the 
"outer limits" that circumscribe the Commission's "permissible area of judgment 
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and discretion." 931 P.2d at 120 (controlling concurrence of Mclff, District 
Judge). If this Court concludes that Petitioners' appeal presents an "outer limits" 
analysis—i.e., that it attempts to show that the Commission's choice of 
methodology was beyond the outer limits of the Commission's discretion—then it 
will accept Petitioners' characterization of their argument as an issue of law, and it 
will review the issue for correctness, without granting the commission deference. 
§ 59-1-610 (l)(b); Exhibit 2, p. 1. 
The Commission, below, has somewhat expressed its own opinion 
regarding the nature of Petitioners' arguments advanced below. It concluded that 
the question of value of the one-acre home sites in this case presents "both legal 
and factual issues." Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16 (emphasis added). Notably, 
however, the Commission did not conclude that the question of methodology was 
a mixed question of fact and law. To the contrary, it found facts to exist that 
render Petitioners' proposed pro rata allocation method inapposite.2 The context 
of the Commission's foregoing statement indicates that the only legal issue it 
found to be mixed with the factual ones was whether Utah Code Section 59-2-
301.2 prohibits the County from complying with Utah Code Section 59-2-507. 
Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16. This issue—advanced at the formal hearing by 
2
 These facts, as discussed in the body of the brief, include the finding that "there 
is a clearly identifiable difference between" the individual acres within the 160-
acre lots due to non-uniform application of a conservation easement. Record at 
64; Exhibit 1, p. 11. This identifiable difference in the acreage creates a "disparity 
in value" among those acres which Petitioners' indiscriminate pro rata allocation 
methodology failed to address. Id. 
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Petitioners' legal expert, Professor David Thomas—appears to have been 
abandoned by Petitioners on appeal, so it is not addressed further in this brief. 
Being thus abandoned by Petitioners, the only legal issue that the Commission 
found to be mixed with the factual ones is no longer involved in this case, and this 
Court can concur with the County's argument that Petitioners present an issue that 
is exclusively one of fact. 
Nevertheless, if this Court concludes, for other reasons, that Petitioners' 
issue mixes questions of law and fact, it will apply an "intermediate level of 
review, which analyzes the decision for reasonableness and rationality." 
Department of Transportation v. Personnel Review Board, 798 P.2d 761, 764 
(Utah App. 1990). "When agency expertise and special knowledge aid in the 
application of statutory terms to factual situations, the decision is reviewed under a 
reasonableness standard." Id. "Thus, agency interpretation of statutes it is 
empowered to administer is often inseparable from its application of the rules of 
law to basic facts." Id. at 764-65 (internal quotations omitted). However, it has 
also been observed, rather unhelpfully, that "[t]he characterization of an issue as a 
mixed question of law and fact sometimes begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as 
to how closely the appellate court will scrutinize what the initial forum has done." 
Aha Pacific, 931 P.2d at 117 (concurrence of Chief Justice Zimmerman). 
C. Issue #3 
The third issue is a question of fact. The standard of review for questions 
of fact is set forth in Utah Code Section 59-l-610(l)(a), which provides that this 
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Court "shall grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of 
fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review." Exhibit 2, p. 1. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the "[substantial evidence standard is that 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable 
mind to support a conclusion." Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 1999 UT 48,1j 
7, 980 P.2d 690, 692 (internal quotations omitted). "In addition, a party 
challenging the Commission's factual findings bears the burden of marshaling all 
evidence supporting the findings and showing that the evidence is insufficient." 
Id. (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 
1993)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
A. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 6(4): 
Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in 
this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize any court 
established under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or 
redetermine any matter decided by the State Tax Commission 
relating to revenue and taxation. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A. Utah Code Section 59-1-610 (Standard of review of appellate court). 
Attached as Exhibit 2. 
B. Utah Code Section 59-2-102(12) (Definition of "fair market value"). 
Attached as Exhibit 3. 
C. Utah Code Section 59-2-507 (Land included as agricultural - Site of 
farmhouse excluded - Taxation of Structures and site of farmhouse). 
Attached as Exhibit 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge presiding, issued April 1, 2008. Judge 
Phan's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision are attached as 
Exhibit 1. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
This case originated at the Utah State Tax Commission ("the 
Commission"), where a formal hearing was held on December 18 and 19, 2007. 
The Commission issued its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decision on April 1, 2008. Record at 54-78; Exhibit 1. Petitioners 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for review on April 10, 2008, pursuant to Utah 
Code Sections 59-1-602 and 63G-4-403. Wasatch County filed a cross-petition in 
the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008. The Supreme Court exercised its 
discretion, as authorized by Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
to delegate this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
C. Disposition at Agency 
The Commission heard sharply divergent evidence regarding the 
appropriate allocation of value to Petitioners' one-acre home sites at issue in this 
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case. Petitioners submitted evidence that the one-acre home sites should be valued 
at l ^ O * of the value of the 160-acre lots in which these home sites are located 
because the home sites, which cannot be sold separately, have no fair market 
value. The County submitted evidence that the one-acre home sites should be 
valued at 65% of the value of the 160-acre lots in which the home sites are located 
because this percentage reflects the value of the legal right to build a home on 
these lots. 
The Commission observed, "[although the one-acre home site may not 
legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County 
assess it at fair market value." Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16. It agreed with both 
parties that the appropriate method to arrive at that fair market value was through 
"allocating" a portion of the fair market value of the entire 160-acre lot to the one-
acre home site. Record at 064; Exhibit, p. 11 ("the County must allocate a fair 
market value to the one-acre based on the express language of the [Farmland 
Assessment Act]"). However, the Commission found that the Petitioners' 
proposed method of allocation—a pro rata method of applying an equal value to 
any given acre within the lot—failed to address the "disparity in value" that should 
be reflected by an appropriate allocation. Id. Consequently, the Commission 
adopted the County's evidence and then applied its own modification to it. 
The Commission concluded that the County's prdposed 65% allocation 
should be attributed to "the developable portion of the land" instead of merely to 
the one-acre home site. Id. Observing that the "developable portion" of each 160-
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acre lot is spread over a ten-acre building envelope, within which each one-acre 
home site must be located, the Commission applied the 65% allocation to this ten-
acre building envelope. Then, to find the value of the one-acre home site within 
that envelope, the Commission divided by ten. Record at 65; Exhibit 1, p. 12. 
This resulted in each home site being allocated 6.5% of the value of its 160-acre 
lot—one order of magnitude greater than suggested by Petitioners and one order of 
magnitude less than suggested by the County. Effectively, this reduced the 
County's proposed valuation of the one-acre home sites by 90%.3 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Petitioners' properties at issue in this appeal are located in the prestigious 
Wolf Creek Ranches subdivision in Wasatch County. This is a platted subdivision 
divided into lots of 160-acres, or larger, in size. Record at 56; Exhibit 1, p. 3. 
"Although each parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one, 
single family home site." Id. Each owner may designate a ten-acre building 
envelope within the lot in which a single primary residence as well as one care-
taker dwelling, bams, corrals, and other agricultural improvements may be 
constructed. Record at 57; Exhibit 1, p. 4. The remaining 150-acres, or more, of 
each lot remains subject to a conservation easement in perpetuity, on which no 
improvements may ever be installed and no mining can ever be conducted. Id. 
Petitioners' property is located in Wasatch County's "Preservation-160 
3
 Petitioners initiated the present appeal because the Commission did not go even 
further and reduce the assessed value of the one-acre home sites by 99%. 
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zone" which allows "one residence per 160 acres." Id. 
Each of Petitioners' lots, prior to 2006, was assessed under the Farmland 
Assessment Act ("the FAA"), found in Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5 of the Utah 
Code. Record at 58; Exhibit 1, p. 5. This act requires county assessors to ignore 
fair market value and "consider only those indicia of value that the land has for 
agricultural use." Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-505(1). By January 1, 2006, 
however, each Petitioner had built, or begun to build, a dwelling on a one-acre 
home site within their respective lots. Section 59-2-507(2) of the FAA requires 
assessors to value "the land on which the farmhouse is located, and land used in 
connection with the farmhouse . . . using the same standards, methods, and 
procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land in the county." 
Exhibit 4, p. 1. In other words, the home site was no longer valued only for its 
"agricultural use," but for its "fair market value." 
Using fair market value analysis and evaluations of comparable properties, 
the Wasatch County Assessor ("the Assessor") had initially determined each one-
acre home site to contain 60% of the value of its respective lot. Consequently, as 
each home site was taken out of the FAA, the Assessor assessed and valued the 
one-acre home sites at 60% of the fair market value of the entirety of each lot. 
The remaining acreage of each lot (159-acres or more) remained in the FAA and 
received the nominal "greenbelt" tax assessment provided under the Act. 
At the formal hearing below, the County presented evidence of its 
allocation methodology and the need for the method to comply with the FAA. 
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The County's expert, Blaine Hales, testified that 65% of the value of each 160-
acre lot should be allocated to its one-acre home site. Record at 1432 (lines 4-16). 
The Petitioners, on the other hand, presented evidence that the one-acre home sites 
had no independent fair market value at all (Record at 69; Exhibit 1, p. 16) and 
proposed that the Commission therefore allocate a pro rata value of 1/160 (or 
about 0.6%) of the value of the 160-acre lot to the one-acre home site. Record at 
60; Exhibit l ,p. 7. 
The Commission found, as a finding of fact, that the Petitioners' proposed 
methodology was unresponsive to the mandates of the FAA and did not "reflect[] 
the reality that the building site is worth more than the undevelopable property 
subject to the conservation easement." Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. In 
addition the Commission held, as a conclusion of law, that "in the absence of 
testimony and evidence [from the Petitioners] to the contrary, [the County's] . . . 
analysis adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the building 
envelope for these properties." Record at 070; Exhibit 1, p. 17. The Commission 
declined, however, to adopt Mr. Hales' recommendation that the 65% allocation 
should be limited only to the one-acre home site. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Petitioners should be barred from challenging the Commission's 
findings of fact. Utah law requires any party challenging the Commission's 
findings of fact to marshal all the facts supporting the finding. Petitioners, having 
characterized the issue they raise as strictly one of law, have declined to marshal 
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the evidence. Therefore, this Court should accept all of the facts, which have not 
been appropriately challenged, as true. 
All the parties agree that "allocation of value" to the one-acre home sites is 
a necessary methodology to apply in this case because the one-acre home sites 
cannot be sold separately from the 160-acre lots in which they are located. 
However, Petitioners suggest that an indiscriminate pro rata allocation is the only 
legally permissible allocation methodology that can be used. The only legal basis 
alleged to support this assertion on appeal is the statutory definition of "fair 
market value." Fortunately, the definition of "fair market value" does not lead to 
this conclusion. Therefore, the Tax Commission appropriately considered the 
reality that each acre within the 160-acre lots is not identical. An accurate 
allocation of fair market value must take into account the property rights and 
potential use that inure to the acre being assessed and valued as required by the 
FAA. 
The Commission found that the County's expert, Blaine Hales, was the 
only witness who attempted to allocate a fair market value to the one-acre home 
sites in a manner that reflected reality. However, the Commission nevertheless 
modified Mr. Hales' recommendations and applied the 65% allocation of value— 
which he had intended only for the one-acre home sites—to the ten-acre building 
envelopes in which the one-acre home sites are located. This modification has the 
practical effect of diluting the value of the home sites by 90%. After marshaling 
the evidence in support of the Commission's finding, the County believes that it 
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becomes apparent that the Commission misconstrued Mr. Hales1 short-handed 
references to the "right to build"—inferring that by this term Mr. Hales was 
referring to the right to build anything. However, taken in context, and taking the 
entirety of Mr. Hales' testimony into account, it becomes clear that Mr. Hales' 
analysis only addressed the one-acre home sites and the right to build a single 
home thereon. He neither attempted nor intended a valuation of the rights to build 
a caretaker dwelling, barns, corrals, or other outbuildings. Thus his 65% 
allocation of value should have been limited to the one-acre home sites as he 
intended. 
14 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITIONERS ARE BARRED FROM CHALLENGING THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT BECAUSE THEY DECLINED 
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Utah Code Section 63G-4-403(4)(g) requires a party seeking relief from an 
"agency action [that] is based upon a determination of fact . . . [to show that the 
agency's determination] is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court." This Court has interpreted section 
63G-4-403(4)(g) to mean that "[a] party seeking to overturn the Commission's 
factual findings must 6marshal[] all of the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" 
Whitear v. Labor Comm fn, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting, in part, 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
App. 1989)). In addition, if a party does not marshal the evidence as explained 
above, this Court "assume[s] the record supports the Commission's findings." 
Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985 (citing Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm >z, 
839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992)). 
In the present case, the Petitioners claim they are not challenging the factual 
findings of the Commission. Brief of Petitioners at 9 ("Petitioners do not appeal 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision Findings of Fact."). However, the 
Petitioners do attempt to promulgate arguments that challenge the very core of the 
Commission's findings of fact. 
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First, the Petitioners challenge the method of land valuation, a classic 
factual determination. See Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 
344, 355 (Utah 1996) (holding "the choice of valuation methodology used in 
fixing the value of a property [to be] a question of fact"). 
At the Commission's formal hearing, Wasatch County presented testimony 
supporting the allocation of 65% of the value of the entire 160-acre lot to the one-
acre home sites. The Petitioners argued that the value of the entire lot was spread 
equally, or pro rata, among each acre of the lot. Ultimately, the Commission 
agreed, generally, with the County's methodology and rejected the Petitioners' 
view of the facts. In fact, the Commission found that the County's expert was the 
only witness who attempted to allocate based on "the reality that the building site 
is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation 
easement." Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. 
Now, on appeal, the Petitioners again argue that the only way to value the 
property is to "establish[] the 'fair market value' of each indivisible part of the lot 
at an equal value to every other indivisible part of the lot." Brief of Petitioners at 
9. Although the Petitioners have not identified the name of the method and have 
changed the language of their description of the method in various places, it is the 
same pro rata method promoted at the formal hearing and which the Commission 
rejected as part of it factual findings. The Commission specifically found that the 
facts do not support a pro rata valuation; instead, it found that the "building site is 
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worth more than the undevelopable" portions of each lot. Record at 064; Exhibit 
l ,p. 11. 
If the Petitioners intended to challenge the Commission's rejection of the 
pro rata method, section 63G-4-403(4)(g) requires them to have marshaled the 
evidence in support of the Commission's decision to reject it and then, only after 
they have done so, state the arguments in favor of the pro rata method. Here, 
however, the Petitioners have declined to marshal the evidence or to even 
accurately recognize the factual nature of their argument. Having declined to 
address the factual underpinnings of the Commission's rejection of their proposed 
methodology, the Petitioners' cannot now attack the rejection. Instead, this Court 
may accept as true the Commission's unchallenged factual finding that the pro 
rata methodology ineffectively captures the value of the one-acre home sites at 
issue here. 
Second, the Petitioners specifically dispute the facts found by the 
Commission. They assert that inappropriate "comparables" were used to establish 
value and that the County's appraisal of the subject property was unsound because 
it "was premised on the false assumption that land possessing building rights is 
always more valuable than land which does not." Brief of Petitioners at 21-22. 
They even cite the appraisal testimony of Phillip Cook, their fact expert at the 
formal hearing, to again urge a pro rata methodology for allocating value to the 
one-acre home sites. Id. at 16-17. However, the suitability of comparables and 
the value of building rights are, of course, quintessential issues of fact. [Moreover, 
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they are inherent to the question of valuation methodology—a recognized factual 
issue. Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 554-55. And the Commission found that 
Petitioners' evidence entirely failed to address the "allocation of] a fair market 
value to the one-acre" home sites "in a manner that reflects the reality that the 
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property." Record at 64; 
Exhibit Up. 11. 
As mentioned above, the Commission found that the Petitioners did not 
present any evidence that sufficiently addressed the fact that each acre in these 
160-acre lots is not equal in value to every other acre. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 
11. The Petitioners have not marshaled the facts that support this finding. On 
appeal, however, the Petitioners argue that the allocation of value utilized by the 
County, and essentially adopted by the Commission, is "entirely arbitrary . . . [and 
a] violation of basic appraisal principles." Brief of Petitioners at 17 (quoting the 
formal hearing testimony of fact expert, J. Phillip Cook). Although the County 
somewhat responds to the substance of this argument in Section II of this brief, 
this Court should not entertain the Petitioners' argument because it neither 
properly identifies the argument as a factual challenge nor marshals the evidence 
supporting the Commission's findings. 
Moreover, because the Petitioners have not marshaled the evidence, this 
Court should accept as true—at least as far as the Petitioners' arguments are 
concerned—all of the facts found to be true by the Commission, including the 
"disparity in value" among the acres in the 160-acre lots. Record at 64; Exhibit 1, 
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p. 11. This is an appropriate result because, by not challenging any factual 
findings, the Petitioners have effectively accepted and endorsed all of the 
Commission's factual findings themselves, even where those findings conflict with 
the arguments and conclusions advocated in their appeal. 
After accepting the Commission's factual findings as true, the Petitioners' 
arguments for a pro rata allocation are factually barred. For example, in 
explaining the "disparity in value" among the acres in the 160-acre lots, the 
Commission found that "once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, 
the value is no longer equally contributed on a per acre basis" within the 160-acre 
lots. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. And it added, "Once the building envelope 
has been established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre 
building envelope and the remainder of the property, a difference that does impact 
how these two portions of property contribute to the value." Id. Having not 
challenged these factual findings, Petitioners' following argument urging a pro 
rata allocation is eviscerated: 
the 'fair market value' of any single acre of an indivisible plat of 
land withdrawn from 'greenbelt' must be assessed for 'rollback' tax 
purposes, at a value that is and can be no higher than the value 
assessed for any other acre. Each of the 160 acres has equal value. 
Brief of Petitioners at 12. 
In sum, the Petitioners would have this Court accept all of the facts found 
by the Commission to be true. See Brief of Petitioners at 3 (stating the petition for 
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review "does not raise an issue of fact"). Nevertheless, they request this Court to 
disregard some of the most important facts found to exist by the Commission by 
promoting arguments inconsistent with those facts. For these reasons, the County 
asks this Court to reject Petitioners' request for relief as inconsistent with the 
unchallenged facts found to be true by the Commission. 
II. UTAH LAW DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE PRORATA METHOD OF 
ALLOCATION AS THE ONLY LAWFUL METHOD OF ALLOCATING 
VALUE WITHIN A PARCEL OF PROPERTY. 
While Petitioners do not cite Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 931 
P.2d 103, 120 (Utah 1997) (Mclff, District Judge, concurring), the County 
recognizes that in rare circumstances the issue of valuation methodology can be a 
question of law when it deals with the "outer limits" that "circumscribe the 
permissible area of judgment and discretion" of the Commission. This precedent 
does not diminish the validity of the County's arguments in section I of this brief, 
however, because the factual finding of "disparity in value" among the acres 
within the 160-acre lots remains an unchallenged finding of fact. This factual 
finding, being unchallenged, eviscerates the applicability of the pro rata method 
of allocation to this case. Nevertheless, the County will briefly show that Utah 
law does not require that a pro rata allocation be the only method of allocation 
used in situations like the present. 
Petitioners' support their argument for a pro rata allocation with only two 
bases—one a matter of fact and one a matter of law. The first basis—the one of 
fact—is that the one-acre home sites cannot be sold separately. The second 
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basis—the one of law—is that the foregoing fact cannot be ignored under Utah's 
definition of "fair market value." The County agrees with the fact that the one-
acre home sites cannot be sold separately. However, neither the definition of "fair 
market value" nor any other Utah law establishes that the pro rata method of 
allocation is the only method that accurately captures the value of indivisible acres 
of land. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-102(12) defines "fair market value" as follows: 
'Fair market value' means the amount at which property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of 
taxation, 'fair market value' shall be determined using the current 
zoning law applicable to the property in question. . . . 
Exhibit 3, p. 1. 
From this definition, it is clear that "fair market value" contemplates a 
hypothetical transaction between a "willing buyer" and a "willing seller." It 
further requires that currently applicable zoning laws be taken into account. 
Before Petitioners' application of this statute to the facts of this case is addressed, 
we will next address the statutes in the FAA that require these one-acre home sites 
to be assessed for their fair market value in the first placQ. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-507(2) explains that the land on which a 
"farmhouse" is located is to be valued differently from tfye rest of the farm; 
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namely, while the farm is valued only for its agricultural use, the land connected 
with the farmhouse is valued for its fair market value: 
All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the 
farmhouse and the land on which the farmhouse is located, and land 
used in connection with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, 
and taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that 
apply to other taxable structures and other land in the county." 
Exhibit 4, p. 1. 
And finally, Utah Code Section 59-2-510, entitled "Separation of land," 
further explains how portions of otherwise agricultural land must be valued and 
assessed differently if they are not being put to agricultural use: 
Separation of a part of the land which is being valued, assessed, and 
taxed under this pa r t . . . for a use other than agricultural, subjects 
the land which is separated to liability for the applicable rollback 
tax, but does not impair the continuance of agricultural use 
valuation, assessment, and taxation for the remaining land if it 
continues to meet the requirements of this part. 
In this case, the Petitioners begin their analysis by conceding that Utah 
Code Section 59-2-510 requires any acre withdrawn from agricultural greenbelt 
status to be subject to the rollback tax described in section 59-2-506. Brief of 
Petitioners at 11. In addition, the Petitioners correctly state that at the time of the 
hearing, "[n]one of the remaining 159 . . . acres ha[d] ceased its agricultural use, 
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and hence remain[ed] subject to agricultural assessment [meaning the greenbelt 
tax break]." Id. However, the Petitioners then cite to the definition of "fair market 
value" to argue that because each 160-acre lot is indivisible, any acre withdrawn 
from greenbelt status must have the same value as any other acre in that lot. Brief 
of Petitioners at 12. But this argument contains a non sequitur which was 
acknowledged by Petitioners' expert at the formal hearing below. 
Petitioners' expert, Professor David Thomas, testified that Utah's definition 
of "fair market value" leads to a result very different from the one the Petitioners 
now advocate. He stated that a literal application of the definition of "fair market 
value" requires that "no fair market value may be assigned to any portion of the 
lots, only to the entire lot" because only the entire lot can be sold. Record at 1306 
(lines 18-20) (emphasis added); see also Record at 1306 (lines 10-11). In response 
to a clarifying question, Professor Thomas stated as follows: 
Mr. Low: Okay. So your position is there is no fair market value for the 
one acre home site upon which the—these petitioners' built their homes? 
Mr. Thomas: For the land, correct. 
Record at 1306 (lines 21-24) (emphasis added). Thus, far from supporting a pro 
rata allocation, Petitioners' reading of the definition of "fair market value" leads 
to the legal conclusion that the one-acre home sites have no fair market value at 
all: they are completely valueless because they are not independently marketable. 
Another absurd consequence of Petitioners' legal theory is that the 
surrounding land still being put to agricultural use would actually continue to be 
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taxed while the one-acre home sites would not. For example, the one-acre home 
site—which must be assessed by its fair market value—would have no fair market 
value, so its tax would be zero. Meanwhile, the surrounding land still being put to 
agricultural use would be taxed not for its "fair market value," but for its "indicia 
of value that the land has for agricultural use." U.C.A. § 59-2-505(1 )(a). Thus the 
agricultural land's indivisibility and unmarketability wouldn't matter; it would still 
have a value and it would still be taxed at something higher than zero dollars. 
This scenario incongruously rewards landowners with a reduction in their property 
taxes for removing land from greenbelt. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
[W]hen interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute's 
plain language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. We 
read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters. We follow the 'cardinal rule that the general 
purpose, intent and purport of the whole act shall control, and that 
all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its 
manifest object.' 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^  17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations omitted); see also 
Zissi v. State Tax Comrn 'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah 1992) ("A general 
rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed as a 
comprehensive whole."). 
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In addition, 
statutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be 
construed together when they relate to the same person or thing, to 
the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or 
object. If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding 
of the legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be 
influenced by another statute, then those statutes should be 
construed to be in pari materia, construed with reference to one 
another and harmonized if possible. 
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985) (footnotes omitted). 
Here, sections 59-2-102(12) (definition of "fair market value") and 59-2-
507 (taxation of farmhouse site) are related and must be read together, giving each 
its intended meaning. Section 59-2-507 tells the County what land to remove 
from agricultural use, or colloquially, greenbelt; namely, the County must value 
the land associated with the farmhouse as residential land separate from the 
surrounding agricultural land. Exhibit 4, p. 1. This mandate applies whether the 
land associated with the farmhouse can be sold separately or not. Section 59-2-
102(12), on the other hand, by defining "fair market value," tells the County how 
to value the land not eligible for agricultural use. Exhibit 3, p. 1. Namely, instead 
of valuing it only for its agricultural value under section 59-2-505, the County 
must recognize the fair market value of the land connected with the farmhouse. 
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The conflict between these two statutes, exploited by Petitioners, arises in 
the not uncommon situation wrhere the agricultural land is located in a zone in 
which it cannot be subdivided. Here, for example, none of the 160-acre lots can 
be subdivided any further because they are located in the P-160 zone; 
nevertheless, the County is required to deduce the fair market value of only one of 
the acres within each lot. Where the acre to be valued cannot be sold separately, 
the question then arises as to how to value that indivisible, unmarketable acre. 
The County is the first to admit that no easy answers exist for resolving the 
difficulties of assessing and valuing an acre which cannot be sold separately. The 
County Assessor testified at the formal hearing how he sought and obtained 
guidance from the state and others regarding how to properly value the one-acre 
home sites at issue here. Record at 1369-71. The County's assessor thoughtfully 
employed a method of allocating fair market value that is logical, responsive to all 
governing law, and fair. The Commission accepted, in large part, this method of 
allocation and observed that it was the only method that "reflected] the reality" of 
the facts on the ground, including the fact that "the building site is worth more 
than the undevelopable property." Record at 064. 
Allocation is, obviously, the only valuation methodology that can be used 
to value an indivisible, unmarketable acre. Even Petitioners' concede this point: 
their proposed pro rata valuation is itself, an allocation; it is merely an 
indiscriminate allocation. Where the acre to be valued cannot be sold separately, 
its value must be deduced by allocating to it a share of the overall fair market 
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value of the entire lot. In the present case, the fair market values of the lots are not 
in dispute—only of the one-acre home sites within those ld>ts. However, while all 
parties agree that allocation is a necessary methodology, differences arise among 
the allocation methods used. Each party's method of allocation is different, and 
each method results in wildly different values—varying by orders of magnitude. 
The County's expert, Blaine Hales, testified that 65% of the value of the 
entire lot should be allocated to the home site. The basis for this testimony is 
articulated in the next section of this brief. The Petitioners, on the other hand, 
proposed and continue to propose, allocation on a pro rata method. Simply put, 
pro rata is a method of allocation which takes the total value of the entire 160-acre 
lot and indiscriminately divides—or allocates—that value equally among all acres 
in the lot, regardless of the features of the land or the limitations imposed on it. 
Under the pro rata method, an acre containing a rocky cliff or a sinkhole is 
as valuable as a wooded acre with a spectacular view, and an acre burdened with 
perpetual restrictions against development is as valuable as an acre suitable for a 
primary residence. Recognizing the obtuseness of the pro rata method of 
allocation, the Commission found that it did not "address[] the disparity in value" 
between the developable and undevelopable portions of the individual lots. Id. 
Neither at the formal hearing nor now, on appeal, do the Petitioners explain 
the significance of treating every acre equally. Certainly, the definition of "fair 
market value" does not lead to Petitioners' proposed method of allocation. 
Instead, as already shown, if anything, Petitioners' view of this definition sets fair 
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market value at zero because the one-acre home sites—alone—can never "change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller." § 59-2-102(12); see also 
Brief of Petitioners at 18 (emphasizing that the definition of "fair market value" 
requires the property to be able to change hands). Apparently uncomfortable with 
the extreme result of their legal theory, the Petitioners back off of it a half-step and 
argue that the one-acre home sites are only almost worthless. But Petitioners' 
proposed pro rata value is itself not a fair market value but an allocation of fair 
market value. It is merely an allocation that ignores the true value of the one-acre 
home site. 
Factually, the pro rata method also ignores the reality on the ground, which 
the Commission attempted to address. In rejecting the pro rata method of 
allocation, for example, the Commission reasoned that "once the 10-acre building 
envelope has been designated, the value is no longer equally contributed on a per 
acre basis." Record at 064. Moreover, the Commission observed that under the 
mandates of the Farmland Assessment Act, "[rjegardless of the fact that a one-acre 
home site may not legally be sold separately from the 159 acres of the lot, the 
County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express 
language of the FAA." Record at 064 (emphasis added). 
In sum, the definition of "fair market value" must be read in light of the 
FAA because sections 59-2-507(2) ("Taxation of structures and site of 
farmhouse") and 59-2-510 ("Separation of land") of the FAA require the County 
to assess and tax, separately from the agricultural acreage, those acres no longer 
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being put to agricultural use. The method of allocation used to accomplish this 
requirement must reflect the value of the home site as a hdme site, and not as an 
indiscriminate acre within the whole. The Commission acted within its expertise 
in concluding that the pro rata method neither reflected reality nor the 
requirements of the FAA. The County asks that this Court likewise recognize the 
shortcomings of the pro rata approach and affirm the Commission's rejection of 
it. 
III. THE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE ONLY 
RELIABLE EVIDENCE IT WAS GIVEN AND ALLOCATED 65% OF 
THE LOT VALUES TO THE ONE-ACRE HOME SITES. 
Utah Code Section 59-l-610(l)(a) states: 
When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before 
the commission, the Court of Appeals . . . shall[] grant the 
commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, 
applying a substantial evidence standard on review. . . . 
Exhibit 2, p. 1. 
In referencing section 59-l-610(l)(a), the Supreme Court of Utah 
concluded: 
Under such a standard, we must uphold the Commission's findings 
of fact if the findings 'are supported by substantial evidence based 
upon the record as a whole.' 
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Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 7z, 916 P.2d 344, 354 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting, in part, Zissi v. State Tax Comm 'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
1992)). 
According to Utah Code Section 63G-4-403(4)(g), this Court will grant a 
party's requested relief if that party has been "substantially prejudiced" by an 
agency action that is "based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency . . . when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." To the 
Court this to means that "[a] party seeking to overturn the Commission's factual 
findings must 'marshalf] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Whitear v. 
Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting, in part, Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 
1989)). 
In this case, the Respondent's expert, Blaine Hales, testified that an 
allocation of 65% of the fair market value of the entire 160-acre lot to the one-acre 
home site was consistent with the commonly accepted standards of appraisal 
practice. Record at 1431-33. The Commission found, as a finding of fact, that the 
Petitioners did not present any evidence "reflecting] the reality that the building 
site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation 
easement." Id. at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. This left Mr. Hales' testimony as the only 
reliable testimony on the appropriate allocation to be made to the one-acre home 
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sites. Nevertheless, the Commission made the factual finding that, "[fjrom a 
review of Mr. Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre 
building site and that of the other witnesses describing the potential for the 10-acre 
envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable portion 
applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre 
home site." Record at 64; Exhibit I, p. 11. 
The County's contention on appeal is that in the absence of reliable 
evidence to the contrary, the Commission had no basis on which to modify the 
conclusions asserted in Mr. Hales' testimony. While Mr. Hales' testimony 
supported an allocation of 65% of the lot's value to the one-acre home site, the 
Commission modified Mr. Hales' conclusions and allocated 65% of each lot's 
value to the ten-acre building envelopes within which each one-acre home site is 
located. The County asserts that the Commission erred in modifying Mr. Hales' 
uncontested testimony. The evidence supporting the Commission's finding, as 
well as that which supports the County's position on this issue are marshaled 
below. 
A. Evidence that Supports the Allocation of 65% of the Value of the Lot to 
the Ten-Acre Building Envelope. 
According to the Commission, the evidence that supports the allocation of 
65% of the value of the lot to the ten-acre building envelope, and not the one-acre 
home site, comes from Mr. Hales' appraisal and formal hearing testimony, as well 
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as other undisputed testimony describing the building potential of the ten-acre 
envelope. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. 
1. Mr. Hales' Appraisal and Testimony 
The Commission's finding most likely stems from Mr. Hales' explanation 
of the building rights associated with each lot in Wolf Creek Ranches. In referring 
to his land valuation methodology, Mr. Hales wrote "we must provide an 
allocation of value between the one-acre building site (with all rights to build) 
versus 159-acres of land with rights to graze, hunt, and recreate." Record at 513-
14 (emphasis added); Exhibit 5, p. 1-2. In addition, at the formal hearing, Mr. 
Hales testified that he arrived at the value of the one-acre home sites in two 
different ways. He valued "one acre of land," and he also valued uthe right to 
build." Record at 1420 (line 5). At times such as this during his testimony, Mr. 
Hales did not clearly specify that he was valuing only the right to build a primary 
residence. Therefore, the Commission may have concluded that his 65% 
allocation included the value of the right to build anything, which right, 
concededly, applies to the entire ten-acre building envelope and not just the one-
acre home site. 
Another example of the blurring that the Commission may have perceived 
to occur between the right to build anything and the right to build a primary 
residence occurred in Mr. Hales' testimony in which he addressed the value of the 
right to build a home: 
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Mr. Low: Urn—and one more point on that. As you are valuing 
that home site and you're attributing to it the right to build and you['re] 
valuing the right to build, there's already a home on that site. True? 
Mr. Hales: Yes. 
Mr. Low: And so to ignore that fact and to value it as if there 
were 1' 160 of a home on that site wouldn't make a whole lot of sense, 
would it? 
Mr. Hales: Well—you have to have the whole building right to 
build a house. There is—in my mind—it's attached to the home site and 
that's how they've been doing it in the past. And if I went out and did the 
direct comparable sales analysis, I would be using the full right to build as 
my—as part of my comparisons. 
Mr. Low: Is—is the building or residence under your 
understanding of the Farmland Assessment Act, an agricultural use? 
Mr. Hales: No. 
Mr. Low: And so to say that that 159/160ths of that right to build 
is being used in the agricultural land around it, does that somehow measure 
to your understanding of the Farmland Assessment Act? 
Mr. Hales: Well, and again, I don't like to divide it into 
percentages, but I just think that that's where the right goes - with the 
house. 
Record at 1423 (starting line 10) to 1424 (ending line 9) (emphases added). 
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Mr. Hales also determined the value of the remaining 159-acres by finding 
sales of comparable properties on which the "right to build" was restricted. Again, 
he referred to this right in general terms that were apparently construed by the 
Commission as the right to build anything. He testified as follows: 
Mr. Low: And then the remainder of the 159 acres, what you 
were valuing there is the area, 159 acres -
Mr. Hales: Yes. 
Mr. Low: And the right to graze and hunting[,] recreation. 
Mr. Hales: And—and I write that down just as a clarification 
point, but it's actually all—all the rights that exist in the property less the 
right to build. 
Record at 1421 (lines 7-14) (emphasis added). 
He further testified that his goal was to find comparables of "land without 
the right to build" to "try to come up with the value for that—that 159 acres." 
Record at 1425 (lines 8 and 16-17). From this and the previous testimony, the 
Commission concluded that Mr. Hales erroneously lumped the nine other acres 
within the ten-acre building envelope—which enjoyed some measure of building 
rights—together with the 150-acres for which all building rights are prohibited by 
the conservation easement. If Mr. Hales was allocating all the rights to build 
anything to the one-acre home sites, then the Commission's expansion of his 
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allocation to the entire ten-acre building envelope in which improvements can 
lawfully occur would have been appropriate.4 
After appraising the value of unbuildable land, the second appraisal 
methodology employed by Mr. Hales was "to look at what people were paying for 
the right to build." Record at 1426 (lines 1-2). He found this value by looking at 
the purchase price of conservation easements that had the effect of "purchasing] 
the rights to build or to strip the land of any right to continue to develop—or build 
cabins or home sites." Record at 1426 (lines 5-7). In discussing this second 
methodology, even counsel for the County, in the questioning, at one point 
inadvertently lumped the nine other developable acres in the ten-acre building 
envelope together with the 150-acres that are restricted by a conservation 
easement. Record at 1429 (lines 14-18). 
Mr. Hales found that the purchase price of a conservation easement that 
restricted all development rights on the burdened land cost between 60% and 70% 
of the total value of the land. Record at 1431 (lines 8-9). Mr. Hales averaged 
these to arrive at a cost of 65% of the total value of the land. Id. He observed that 
some comparable conservation easements allowed some limited building rights, 
4
 However, one of the errors of the Commission's ruling is that it only valued what 
it perceived to be "the right to build." It neglected to value the land itself. Mr. 
Hales1 65% figure, however, valued both "one acre of land" and the "right to 
build" on it. Record at 1420 (line 5). By expanding the right to build to all ten 
acres in the building envelope, but without including a value of the other nine 
acres of land, the Commission only took into account one part of Mr. Hales' two-
part calculus. 
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such as the right to build a future cabin, and so he placed less reliance on these 
comparables. Id. (lines 1-6). 
In combining these two approaches—the value of "unbuildable" land and 
the value of "the right to build"—Mr. Hales testified that, for example, of 
Petitioner Osborn's 160-acre lot worth $1.8 million, $1.2 million was attnbutable 
to "that legal right [to build] plus an acre of land." Record at 1433 (lines 1-5). 
The foregoing testimony can be construed to support the inference that Mr. 
Hales' appraisal models depended on the assumption that all rights to build 
anything were restricted to the one-acre building site of each lot, and that that 
single acre, therefore, should be allocated all of the value to build anything. It 
could also support the conclusion that he inadequately accounted for the remaining 
nine "buildable" acres within the ten-acre building envelope. If the Commission 
was correct that Mr. Hales' allocation rested on this assumption, then it properly 
expanded Mr. Hales' 65% allocation to include all ten acres within the approved 
building envelopes, in which Petitioners do in fact enjoy some rights to build 
improvements. 
2. Testimony Describing the Building Potential of the Ten-acre 
Envelope 
As part of its factual findings, the Commission stated that part of the reason 
for allocating 65% of the value of each lot to the ten-acre building envelope was 
because of the "potential" of the envelope, as described by some of the witnesses 
at the hearing. Record at 064; Exhibit 1, p. 11. The formal hearing testimony was 
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unanimous in acknowledging that the ten-acre building envelope, of which the 
one-acre home site is part, is the only portion of the 160-acre lots that can be 
developed and improved. The Commission correctly observed that the right to 
build and improve, which is restricted entirely to the ten-acre building envelope, 
makes that acreage the most valuable part of the lot. Moreover, once the ten-acre 
building envelope is designated, there is no restriction as to which acre may 
contain the primary residence; it can be built anywhere within the envelope. 
Record at 1462 (lines 3-5) (testimony of Douglas Anderson). 
Robert Crawford, Ph.D, testified that the highest and best use of each lot 
was as a 160-acre residential lot. Id. at 1337. Mr. Douglas Anderson, the 
developer of Wolf Creek Ranches, added that the purpose of the Ranch was to 
preserve as much land as possible while limiting development to a primary 
residence and a few other improvements within a ten-acre building envelope. Id. 
at 1461-62. Furthermore, Mr. Glen Burgener, Wasatch County Assessor, testified 
that extensive consultation with the State Tax Commission's Property Tax 
Division resulted in several conclusions, including that the "bulk of the value 
should be in that area that can be disturbed," meaning the "10 acre area of 
disturbance." Id. at 1371 (lines 13-15). 
Reading the testimony of Dr. Crawford, Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Burgener 
together most likely led the Commission to reason that since development and 
improvement may take place on ten acres, and not just one, the ten-acre building 
envelope is what Mr. Hales was referring to when he discussed the value of the 
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"right to build." Therefore, under this view of Mr. Hales' testimony, his 65% 
allocation should have been spread over the ten-acre building envelope and not the 
one-acre home site. 
B. Evidence that Supports the Allocation of 65% of the Value of the Lot to 
the One-Acre Home Site. 
The Commission was correct in finding the ten-acre building envelope to 
be the most valuable land within the 160-acre lots, because the only improvements 
permitted on the lot must exist within the confines of these building envelopes. 
However, the Commission erred in finding the ten-acre building envelope to be 
65% of the fair market value of the entire lot because there was no substantial 
evidence to support such a finding. Instead, the only appraisal testimony found to 
be reliable by the Commission—that of Blaine Hales—was directed at the right to 
build a primary residence on one-acre of land, and not the right to build a 
caretaker's dwelling, barn, corral or other structure within the other nine acres of 
the ten-acre building envelope. While this distinction could have been made more 
clearly, the evidence taken as a whole indicates that this is what was meant. 
First, at the formal hearing, Mr. Hales plainly testified that his appraisal 
was directed at arriving at the value of the one-acre home sites, and not the value 
of the as yet undeveloped nine acres within the ten-acre building envelope: 
Mr. Low: What was the purpose of the preparation of your 
report? 
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Mr. Hales: Um—when I was—when I was contacted, I was asked 
to help estimate the value—or allocate the value of the—the home site of a 
property for greenbelt purposes. 
Record at 1413 (lines 16-21) (emphasis added). 
This understanding was repeated later: 
Mr. Low: Okay. As you followed through with your assignment, 
I guess, which was to appraise the one acre home site—the home sites 
here— 
Mr. Hales: Mm-hmm. 
Record at 1415 (starting line 24) to 1416 (ending line 2). 
In light of this understanding, Mr. Hales testified that the one-acre home 
site, and not the ten-acre building envelope, should be allocated 65% of the fair 
market value of the entire lot. He stated: 
Mr. Hales: Right. And I used . . . data that was measured in 
percentages and that it would be reasonable for the county assessor because 
each lot up there—you know—has a different value. And the value of 
the—what they 're buying is a home site—and so that percentage would 
cross over well as we appraise other properties or as the assessor appraises 
other properties. If he has a percentage, he can be more consistent in his 
evaluation. 
Mr. Low: Okay. And what is that percentage? 
Mr. Hales: That percentage is 65% [of the value of the lot]. 
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Record at 1432 (lines 6-16) (emphasis added). 
The home site, and not the building envelope, was the focus of Mr. Hales' 
testimony because Utah Code Section 59-2-507(2) only requires the "site of the 
farmhouse," or "the land on which the farmhouse is located" to be valued for its 
residential use. Neither the County, nor the Commission for that matter, was ever 
required to value the other nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope in this case 
because none of those other nine acres had been removed from agricultural use. 
It is evident from the language used throughout the CC&Rs of Wolf Creek 
Ranches, and especially in Section 7.3 of that document, that the home site is that 
parcel of land on which the primary single family dwelling is constructed. Record 
at 125; Exhibit 6, p. 1. Section 7.3 also makes a plain distinction between the site 
on which the primary dwelling is located and the rest of the developable area, 
including the site of the caretaker dwelling and the sites of the allowable 
nonresidential improvements. Record at 125; Exhibit 6, p. 1. 
Mr. Hales and other witnesses distinguished between the one-acre on which 
the home is located and the larger ten-acre building envelope, of which the home 
site is a part. 
i Mr. Low: . . . And you indicate that the building site which you 
are allocating to that, and which you are valuing, was one-acre of land in 
terms of space and area, is that right? 
Mr. Hales: Yes. 
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Mr. Low: And that's consistent with the area that Mr. Burgener 
[Wasatch County Assessor] said that he applies countywide—the 
home site in agricultural land is one-acre. 
Mr. Hales: Right. 
Record at 1420 (lines 14-22). 
Given that Mr. Hales' testimony plainly articulated the value of the one-
acre home site to be 65% of the value of the lot, and given that the meaning of the 
term "home site" was understood by the parties and the Commission, the 
Commission can only have inferred that Mr. Hales' short-hand references during a 
part of his testimony to the "right to build" included the right to build anything, 
and not just the right to build a primary residence on the one-acre home site. This 
inference would have led the Commission to allocate Mr. Hales' 65% value of the 
"right to build" to the ten-acre building envelope instead of to the one-acre home 
site as he had recommended. 
That the Commission's application of Mr. Hales' testimony to the ten-acre 
building envelope is mistaken should be clear from the context of his testimony. 
For example, at one point Mr. Hales stated that what he was "valuing here is one 
acre of land and the right to build." Record at 1420 (lines 4-5). Taken in 
isolation, this shorthand reference to "the right to build" could be inferred to mean 
the right to build anything in the ten-acre building envelope. However, just a few 
lines later the meaning was clarified as the "right to build a residence." Record at 
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1420 (lines 23-25) through 1421 (lines 1-6); see also Record at 1420 (lines 19-22) 
(narrowing the right to build to the "home site"). 
Mr. Hales' testimony only supports the conclusion that 65% of the value of 
the lot should be allocated to the one-acre home site. 
Mr. Low: . . . [W]hy did you feel that that was the way to go 
about this [meaning, to value the home site via allocation]? You valued the 
one-acre home sites, you value the land at one-acre, plus that one stick of 
the right to build. Could you explain that to me? 
Mr. Hales: . . . . The point is there is one building right and the 
question is should that value be included with the home site or should it be 
included with the agricultural land and kept from being taxed as most 
homeowners are taxed. And the way that they've been doing [assessments] 
in the past is the right to build . . . is valued in that one-acre home site 
because they used comparable sales of one-acre lots that are improved with 
homes. 
Mr. Hales: . . . . [I]f you go and look at the property [in Wolf 
Creek Ranches] and look at all of the amenities that a property owner 
would enjoy for having a one-acre home site in that subdivision, that would 
be a very valuable site. And no, a one-acre lot is not w[or]th as much as a 
160 acre lot, but it is still very, very valuable. 
Record at 1421 (starting line 21) through 1423 (ending line 9). 
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Thus Mr. Hales' 65% allocation represents two figures: "one acre of land" 
plus "that one stick" of legal rights; namely, the right to build a home on that acre. 
At no point in Mr. Hales' testimony did he ever discuss or attempt to value the 
right to build a caretaker's dwelling, a barn, a corral, or any other such 
outbuilding. Neither did he attempt to value the nine acres of land remaining in 
the ten-acre building envelopes. The complete lack of any evidence regarding 
these values should have given the Commission pause before expanding Mr. 
Hales' 65% figure to the ten-acre building envelope. 
One reason why the value of the right to build a barn, corral, or other 
outbuilding was not attempted is that it might not be possible to do so. In 
discussing the value of land that lacks the "right to build," Mr. Hales addressed 
one of his comparables that also lacked the "right to build." It was an 80-acre 
parcel adjacent to Wolf Creek Ranches. Record at 1427 (lines 18-24). An issue 
had previously developed in the testimony of Petitioners' appraisal expert, Philip 
Cook, as to whether this particular comparable was an appropriate one because it 
was purchased by the owner of adjacent land and, when combined with the 
adjacent land, gave that purchaser at least 160-total acres—the minimum size to 
qualify for a building permit. This purchaser, prior to purchasing the 80-acre 
parcel, apparently lacked sufficient acreage to obtain a building permit. In 
discussing the "right to build" that sprang into existence as a result of this 
purchase, the right was repeatedly referred to as the ability to acquire a "building 
permit." Record at 1428 (lines 1-2, lines 6-7, line 14); Record at 1429 (line 2). 
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The equating of the "right to build" with a "building permit" is instructive 
regarding the intent of Mr. Hales' testimony. Utah law does not require a building 
permit for "a stmcture used solely in conjunction with agriculture use, and not for 
human occupancy." Utah Code Section 58-56-4(5)(a). Thus, even though the 
Petitioners' lots are located in the P-160 zone, this zone only limits the ability to 
obtain permits to build a home, and not the ability to build a bam, a corral, or other 
outbuildings. Valuing the right to build a bam, therefore, is impractical. In fact, 
even when Mr. Hales valued the conservation easement itself, he only used 
comparables that stripped the right to build homes and cabins, not bams and 
corrals. Record at 1426 (lines 5-7). Therefore, where Mr. Hales never intended to 
value the right to build bams, corrals, and outbuildings, the repeated short-hand 
references in his testimony to the "right to build" clearly referred to the right to 
build a home. And each 160-acre lot authorized the construction of only a single 
primary residence. When valuing this right—the right to build a home—Mr. 
Hales attributed that entire right only to the one-acre home site where that right 
was exercised, and not to the other nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope 
where it was not. 
The reason for allocating that entire right only to the one-acre home site is 
succinctly put by Mr. Hales when he said, 
"Well—you have to have the whole building right to build a house. There 
is—in my mind—it's attached to the home site and that's how they've been 
doing it in the past. And if I went out and did the direct comparable sales 
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analysis, I would be using the full right to build as my—as part of my 
comparisons." 
Record at 1423 (lines 18-23). Thus, in Mr. Hales' methodology, the 65% 
allocation attributable to the right to build a home should be allocated to that acre 
where this right was exercised, and not spread among an additional nine acres 
where it was not exercised. 
The evidence at the formal hearing was that the P-160 zone in which 
Petitioners' properties are located permitted them to build one single family 
residence. Record at 56; Exhibit 1, p. 3.5 The conservation easement which 
burdened these lots mirrored the requirements of the zone: one home site is 
allowed, as well as one caretaker's dwelling and as many agricultural buildings or 
improvements as desired. Record at 57; Exhibit 1, p. 4. 
It is noteworthy that the Commission observed that the County did not 
provide evidence showing "which portion of the [65%] is attributable to each acre 
[in the ten-acre building envelope]." Record at 065; Exhibit 1, p. 12. The 
Commission is absolutely correct in this observation. The County did not present 
evidence of value of the other nine acres within the ten-acre building envelope 
because those acres were not at issue: they had not been removed from 
agricultural use. Consequently, these other nine acres were not the focus of the 
case, and the County had no reason to obtain or present evidence establishing their 
5
 What is less clear in the record is that the zone, at the time this development 
vested in its property rights, also allowed the construction of a single caretaker's 
dwelling. This right is also guaranteed by the conservation easement. 
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value. Therefore, it is somewhat inconsistent for the Commission to apply Mr. 
Hales' 65% allocation figure to the entire ten-acre building envelope—when he 
intended it to only apply to the one-acre home site—and then fault Mr. Hales for 
not telling them how to do it. 
Nevertheless, when examining Mr. Hales' figures, it is seen that there is 
room for inference on the approximate value of the remaining nine acres within 
the ten-acre building envelopes. He testified that 65% of the value of the 160-acre 
lot should be allocated to the one-acre home site. He also testified that the 
conservation-easement burdened land should be valued at about $3,000 per acre. 
Record at 1432 (lines 2-3). Applying these figures to the facts at hand, of a typical 
160-acre lot worth $1.8 million, the one-acre home site, at 65%, should be valued 
at $1.2 million. Record at 1432 (starting line 17) through 1433 (ending line 5). 
The 150 undevelopable acres, at $3,000 per acre, should be valued at about 
$450,000. Adding the value of the one-acre homesite ($1.2 million) to the value 
of the 150 undevelopable acres ($450,000) equals $1.65 million. Under Mr. 
Hales' analysis, therefore, approximately $150,000 of the $1.8 million lot value 
remains available for allocation to the remaining nine acres within the ten-acre 
building envelopes. 
If asked, Mr. Hales could have investigated and testified as to how to 
allocate this $150,000 to the other nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope. 
However, as those nine acres were not at issue, any differences in allocation 
among them were never discussed. Therefore, while we know that about 
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SI50,000 should be allocated to those nine acres, we don't know whether any 
particular acre within those nine should be valued differently from another. 
Nevertheless, the Commission's decision entirely ignores, certainly inadvertently, 
this 5150,000 of unallocated value. When the Commission expanded Mr. Hales' 
65% value—which he had intended to apply only to the one-acre homesite—to 
apply to the entire ten-acre building envelope, this unallocated $150,000— 
intended to apply to the remaining nine acres in the envelope—escaped the 
Commission's attention. Under the Commission's decision as it now stands, this 
$150,000 apparently must remain forever unallocated. 
Not only does the Commission's decision erroneously fail to account for, or 
allocate, $150,000 of the fair market value, but it also unreasonably dilutes the 
value of the one-acre home sites as testified to by Mr. Hales. Mr. Hales was the 
only witness who allocated a fair market value to the one-acre home sites "in a 
manner that reflects the reality that the building site is worth more than the 
undevelopable property." Record at 64; Exhibit 1, p. 11. Nevertheless, after 
finding his testimony to be the only helpful testimony on the issue, the 
Commission diluted the value he established by 90%, or by one entire order of 
magnitude. Thus the Commission not only arbitrarily expanded Mr. Hales' 
testimony (by applying the 65% figure to the entire ten-acre parcel), but it then 
also arbitrarily contracted it (by dividing by 10 to find the value of the one-acre 
home site). 
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In light of these facts, it is no wonder that the Commission felt itself to be 
"unable to further determine which portion of the [65%] value is attributable to 
each acre [within the ten-acre building envelope], other than using 1/10 of the 65% 
of the total market value.'' Record at 065; Exhibit 1, p. 12. The Commission had 
not been given any guidance in carrying out this unwarranted exercise. Moreover, 
the Commission had overlooked that Mr. Hales' testimony intended for the 
remaining, unallocated 5150,000 to be allocated to the nine remaining acres within 
the ten-acre building envelope. As the Commission, by its own admission, lacked 
substantial evidence on how to expand, and then contract, Mr. Hales' testimony, 
this Court should reverse its factual findings on this point and, based on the record, 
recognize the value of the one-acre home sites as 65% of the value of the entire 
lot. 
As a final matter, the County is required to establish substantial prejudice 
before this Court will reverse the Commission's findings of fact. § 63G-4-
403(4)(g). The Commission's decision to allocate the one-acre home sites a value 
of 6.5% of the entire lot value prejudices the County and its citizens. It artificially 
reduces the value of the home sites by an entire order of magnitude (from an 
average of SI.2 million down to an average of 5120,000), and it thereby 
improperly shifts the property tax burden among the population. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Wasatch County asks this Court to uphold the 
Utah State Tax Commission's rejection of Petitioners' proposed pro rata 
allocation methodology. Further, Wasatch County asks this Court to reverse the 
Commission's factual finding that 65% of the value of each lot is attributable to 
the ten-acre building envelope. In place of the latter factual finding, the County 
asks this Court to allocate 65% of the value of each lot to the one-acre home sites 
that have been established in each lot. 
DATED this ^2— day of December, 2008. 
'-&*&&0^T/) 
THOMAS L. LOW, Attorney for Wasatch County 
Appellee and Cross-appellant 
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EXHIBIT 1 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORN, MICHAEL F. 
SULLIVAN. DAVID AND CYNTHIA MIRSKY, 
NORMAN PROVAN, JEFFREY AND NANCY 
TRUMPER, GARY AND CATHERINE 
CRITTENDEN, DAVID CHECKETTS AND 
MOUNT CLYDE ENTERPRISES L.C , 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH 
COUNTY, UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505. 06-1506, 06-
1507,06-1508.06-1509,06-1510 
Tax Type. Property Tax, Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2006 & Roll Back Period 2001-05 
Judge: Phan 
This Order may contain confidential ''commercial information" within the meaning of Utah Code Sec. 59-1-404, 
and is subject to disclosure restrictions as set out in that section and Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37. The rule 
prohibits the parties from disclosing commercial information obtained from the opposing party to nonparties, 
outside of the hearing process. However, pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37 the Tax Commission may 
publish this decision, in its entirety, unless the property taxpayer responds in writing to the Commission, within 
30 days of this order, specifying the commercial information that the taxpayer wants protected. 
Presiding: 
# Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
Marc Johnson, Commissioner 
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Max Miller. Attorney at Law 
Randy Grimshaw, Attorney at Law 
Norman Provan. Owner 
Douglas Anderson. Developer 
For Respondent: Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney 
Glen Bursener, Wasatch Countv Assessor 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing: on December 
18-19, 2007 Based upon the ev idence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its" 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioners are appealing the assessed values as set by the Wasatch County Board of 
Equalization for the land on the subject lots, for the 2006 tax year. In addition to the 2006 assessed value, 
Petitioners Sullivan, Mirsky, Crittenden, Provan and Trumper are appealing the rollback tax assessment against 
each of their properties subject to this appeal. 
2. As of the lien date at issue the properties had residences or buildings either constructed or in 
partial states of construction. The value of the buildings was not at issue in this appeal. 
3. The subject properties are all located in the Wolf Creek Subdivision in Wasatch County. The 
owner, parcel number, size and valuations as assessed by Respondent, which are the subject of this appeal, are 
as follows: 
Petitioners Lot/Parcel No. Acres County's Rollback County Board's 2006 
Values Appealed Values Appealed 
No Rollback Land-GreenBelt $ 201,800 
Appeal Land-Homesite $ 550,000 
Warren & Tricia Osborn 61/OWR-4B61 160 
Michael Sullivan 46/OWR-3A46 184 
David & Cynthia Mirsky 53>OWR-4A53 160 
Gary & Catherine 75/OWR-5B75 160 
Crittenden 
Norman Provan 25/OWR-2A25 160 
Jeffrev & Nancy Trumper 50<OWR-3A50 160 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,288 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
2002-2006 Land-Greenbelt $1,150,000 
$698,200 per year 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 562.100 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $1,080,000 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 476,800 
$773,200 per year Land-Homesite $ 773,200 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,000 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
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David Checketts& Mount 12OWR-2012 160 No Rollback Land-Greenbelt S 201.800 
Clyde Enterprises LC Appeal Land-Homesite $ 845.000 
4. The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision ("Ranch") is an exclusive, approved and platted 
subdivision. It covers approximate!) 14,000 acres and has 84 single-family home site parcels. With the 
exception of a few parcels, all home site parcels in the subdivision are at least 160 acres. All parcels subject to 
this appeal are 160 acres or larger. Access to the subdivision is from a main gate at 3480 Bench Creek Road in 
WToodland and a secondary gate located off of Lake Creek Road in Heber City. Access to the subject lots is 
provided year round by paved interior roadways, which are maintained by the subdivision. 
5. The land uses surrounding the Ranch are primarily recreational and agricultural in nature. The 
Ranch shares approximately seven miles of common boarder with the Uinta National Forest on the east, which 
is accessible from the Ranch. Jordanelle Reservoir is ten miles west and Rockport State Park and Reservoir 20 
miles north. Park City with its ski and summer resorts is located approximately 22 miles northwest. 
6. The subdivision amenities at the Ranch include a 26-acre common area with an equestrian 
center and stables, a 2,800 square foot guesthouse and two large trout stocked ponds. There is another 23-acre 
common area with tepees, fire pits, campground areas, corrals and approximately one-mile of frontage along 
the Upper Provo River. There are several >urts at the property that can be accessed by the residents. There is 
approximately fifty miles of equestrian trails through the ranch and the entire property is protected by private 
security. 
7. Although each subject parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one, single-
family home site. 
8 The limitations on development are both from zoning and a conservation easement. The 
property is zoned P-160 under the jurisdiction of Wasatch County P-160 is a preservation zoning where 
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development may be limited do to remoteness of services, topograph) and other sensitive environmental issues. 
Residential development is allowed in the zoning with basically one residence per 160 acres. Conditional uses 
include groupings of residential lots provided that density is not increased, water storage, fishing activities and 
sand and gravel quarrying. 
9. The principal developer of the Ranch, Douglas Anderson, testified that the area had been 
ranched for over one hundred years and it wras the intent in developing the Ranch to preserve large amounts of 
open space and continue the ranching tradition. As there was the possibly that zoning could be changed and 
higher density allowed at some point in the future by the County or other governmental jurisdiction, to insure 
the restrictions remained permanently, they placed conservation easements on the property as it was 
subdivided. The conservation easements were granted to the Utah Open Lands Conservation Association, Inc. 
As such the subject lots are permanently encumbered by the conservation easements. The conservation 
easements allow for one-home site with the improvements specifically limited to the 10-acre building envelope. 
Within the 10-acre building envelope the property owner may construct both a primary single-family residence 
and a caretaker residence. A garage and other barns and outbuildings may be constructed. All the buildings 
must be located within the ten-acre envelope as well as any roadways, utility lines; water wells water storage 
tanks, waterlines and septic tanks. The 10-acre building area may not be located in wildlife birthing areas, 
goshawk nesting habitats or riparian areas. The conservation easement would permanently prohibit buildings 
or other improvements on the acres outside of the 10-acre building envelope. Further, there could be no 
quarrying or mining on the property. 
10. Subject to some restrictions, that included specified habits and riparian areas or the County 
building requirements regarding slope and setbacks, the purchaser chooses which ten contiguous acres to use 
for the building envelope, and then chooses the home site within those acres. Norman Provan. an owner of one 
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of the subject lots, and Mr. Anderson both testified that not onl> could the homeowners choose the site of the 
building envelope it was possible to move the building envelope at least until construction commenced, and 
even then there was some possibility of adjustment as long as it encompassed the buildings. Mr. Andersen 
testified that typically the location of the building envelope was limited only by County building restrictions. 
During the period now subject to the rollback, the 10-acre building envelopes had not yet been designated. 
Based on these factors the Commission fmds that during the rollback period there was no specific one-acre of 
the property designated as the home site or ten acres designated as the building envelope. 
11. Mr. Provan, an owner of one of the subject lots testified that he purchased the lot because of 
size and restrictions on development. He indicated he chose the property over other subdivisions because he 
liked that all 14,000 acres would be preserved with the same restrictions and remain as a wilderness setting. 
He also felt he was doing something good by preserving open space Another owner, Mike Sullivan testified 
that they purchased the property because they wanted the large acreage and a place to ride their horses. It was 
his understanding that the restrictions on the property made it so that each lot could not be subdivided. 
12. As the property had been ranched for many years it had been assessed under the Farmland 
Assessment Act ("F AA") for property tax purposes, based on its agricultural use, rather than its market value. 
Agricultural use continues over most of the Ranch property as of the date of the hearing as the Homeowners 
Association leases the Ranch property out to a sheep operation. A property owner may fence their 10-acre 
building envelope to keep the sheep out of that portion of the property, but must allow sheep to graze on the 
remaining acreage. As of the lien date, none of the Petitioners had chosen to fence their 10-acre building 
envelopes and have allowed the sheep to graze throughout their properties. The Count} had assessed these 
properties with the entire parcel valued as greenbelt property under the FAA even after the subdivision was 
platted, up until the time a building permit was issued. Once a building permit was taken out on a particular 
o — 
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parcel the Counts removed the one-acre home site from valuation under the FAA and that one-acre became 
subject to the roll back tax. However, the County considered the other 159-acres or more on each parcel to 
remain as greenbelt and the County continues to assess the remaining acres under the FAA. 
13. The FAA requires disparate treatment regarding the home site and remaining acres that are 
ranched or farmed. Pursuant to the FAA. the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is not 
taxed under the act. but is instead assessed based on fair market value For greenbelt properties located outside 
of city limits, Wasatch County applies a standard of one as the land used in connection with the farmhouse, or 
home site. 
14. As there had been sales of lots in the Ranch, there was market information to determine a fair 
market value for each parcel at issue The reason the matter came before the Commission for the Formal 
Hearing was that the parties were in disagreement on how much of the total value of the 160-acre parcels 
should be attributed to the one-acre home sites. A determination of the value for the one-acre is relevant for 
the purposes of determining the amount of the rollback, as well as for the assessment for the 2006-year. 
15. When the County issued the Tax Notices for the years that are now subject to the rollback, the 
notices did not list out or allocate a portion of the total market value to either the home site acre or the building 
envelope. Instead, the notices listed a single, total market value for the entire parcels Because the property 
was taxed as greenbelt under the FAA, the amount of the tax assessed, however, was not based on the market 
value, but instead on the greenbelt value pursuant to the FAA. 
16. Petitioners submitted an appraisal for each of the properties at issue, which had been prepared 
by Philip Cook, MAI, and CRE. Mr. Cook's appraisal was limited to a market valuation of the land only It 
was Mr Cook's appraisal conclusion that there was some variation in values between the lots, due to factors 
like view, slope and forestation It was his appraisal conclusion that the total market value of the land for each 
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of the parcels at issue, as of January 1. 2006, was as follov\s: 
Lot 12 $1.3 50.000 
Lot 25 $1,340,000 
Lot 46 $1,410,000 
Lot 50 $1,715,000 
Lot 53 $1,285,000 
Lot 61 $1,715,000 
Lot 75 $1,850,000 
17. Mr. Cook's market values for each subject parcel were not substantially disputed by 
Respondent. Mr. Cook's market value conclusions for the land were based on eleven lot sales, all located 
within the Ranch. The sales had occurred from October 2004 through May 2006. The lots had sold for prices 
ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,800,000. 
18. In his appraisal Mr Cook also gave his opinion of how the total value should be allocated to 
the various components of the lot, including the one-acre home site. It was his position that allocations to the 
functional areas of each lot must reflect the market value and he indicated there were circumstances when a 
separate value for a home site consisting as part of a larger parcel could be determined. However, it was his 
conclusion that in this matter, any allocation of the total purchase price of the) lot to the home site was simply 
not market supported. He reached this conclusion because the 160 acres could not be subdivided and with the 
restrictions from zoning and conservation easements the highest and best use of the subject lots were as large 
160-acre single family lots. He pointed to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and 
indicates that they specifically warn against allocating value without market support.1 It was his opinion that 
the County had apportioned the values to the various components of the lots arbitrarily It was Mr Cook's 
conclusion that if it is necessary to allocate or apportion part of the total lot value to the home site acre, it could 
only be done pro rata. 1 160th of the total value, as it is the entire lot and the similarity to all other lots within 
1 Mr Cook cites to Imform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisory Opinions. 2006 Edition. Appraisal 
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the development that create the value. 
19. David A. Thomas, Professor of Law. testified that the zoning and conservation easement had 
to be taken into account in determining the value. It was his opinion that it was not legal to buy or sell any 
portion of the lot smaller than the total 160 acres. This was a point that was supported bv all evidence and not 
disputed. It was Professor Thomas* conclusion that because OIIQ acre could not be sold separately, there was 
no fair market value for the one-acre home site, only a value for the property as a whole. Professor Thomas 
also pointed out that additional value will be taxed in the improvements. 
20. Robert Crawford, PhD, testified that the conservation easement actually enhanced the value of 
the property. He also testified that the highest and best use of the property was not for agriculture, it was 
instead as a 160-acre residential building lot. As part of the whole he concluded that each acre of the 160-acre 
property had the same value as all the other acres. He stated that a fair market value for the one-acre home site 
could be determined but only on the basis of 1/160 of the total value as indicated by Mr. Cook. It was Dr. 
Crawford^s conclusion that recognizing an allocated valuation method to all the acres is economically valid as 
it the way of expressing the enhanced value of the whole. The right to build a residence somewhere on the 
property presumably increase the value of the 160 acre lot. That will be reflected in the price per acre. He did 
not find an extracted market value using lots similar in size that have sold to be a valid valuation technique. 
21. Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified that under the FAA, the County is 
required to allocate a portion of the total value to the home site acre, which is subject to tax on a fair market 
value basis, while the remainder of the property was taxable under greenbelt. He testified that he had been 
applying the FAA to properties for seventeen years in Wastatch County. The County had farms with home 
sites on numerous properties of varying zones where the County is required to allocate a portion of the total 
Standards Board. The Appraisal Foundation, Standards Rule 1 -4(e; Comment 
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value to the home site. In addition to farms in the P-160 zone, there were farms with home sites on properties 
in the following zones: A-20 allowing only I residence per 20 acres; R-A-5 allowing only one residence per 5 
acres; R-A-l allowing onlv one residence per 1-acre. To establish a value for the home site, the County would 
consider values of buildable lots in the area. It was the County's position that the right to build a residence is 
part of the home site value. 
22. In 1999, when the subject lots were platted and because of the conservation easement, Mr. 
Burgener sought adv ise from representatives of the State Tax Commission's Propertv Tax Division on how to 
allocate the total values of the propertv. At this time, the County made the determination that the total value, 
which was based on the sales, would be allocated 60% to the primary residential buildable site, 22% to the 
secondary or caretaker's buildable site, $25,000 per acre to the rest of the acres in the building envelope and 
whatever was left of the market value to the remaining acres. It was the County *s position that a substantial 
portion of the value of the remaining 150-acres shifted to the 10 acres building envelope due to the 
conservation easement. However, this valuation break out was not conveyed to the property owners on the 
annual Tax Notices issued for the years that are now subject to the rollback. 
23. Blaine D. Hales, Certified General Appraiser, prepared an appraisal for the Respondent for 
purposes of estimating the value of the one-acre home site on the property. The appraisal was prepared for one 
lot Lot 75, which was the Crittenden property. It was the County's intent that the same methodology for 
determining the value for the home site be applied to the other properties. It was Vlr Hales conclusion that the 
total value of Lot 75 was SI, 800,000, of which SI,200,000 was for the one-acre home site and S600.000 for 
the reaming 159 acres. 
24 In his appraisal. Mr Hales determined the value of the one-acre site by estimating the overall 
value of the entire parcel and using additional data to allocate or estimate the value contributed by the one-acre 
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home site to the overall parcel. It was his conclusion that he could determine a fair allocation of the market 
value, despite that the one acre could not be legally sold separately. 
25. Like Mr. Cook. Mr. Hales' estimate of the total market value came from sales within the 
Ranch, all located very near Lot 75. He also considered the purchase price of Lot 75, which was $1,800,000 
on October 29, 2004. It was his conclusion that the fair market value of the land only on Lot 75. as of the 
January 1. 2006 lien date, was $1,800,000. As a comparison, Mr. Cook had valued this lot at $1,850,000. 
26. To determine a value for the one acre home site, it was Mr. Hales position that the building 
site, when reduced to one acre, must also include the legal right to construct a home because the appraiser must 
be careful to divide both the physical and legal components of the property. He attributed the right to build to 
the one acre while the remaining 159 acres he considered to have only the limited agricultural and recreational 
uses. 
27. To estimate the allocation to the one acre, Mr. Hales relied on two methods: 1) determining the 
value of the unbuildable portion of the property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build by 
considering sales of conservation easements. To determine the value of the unbuildable land, Mr. Hales found 
six comparables of rangeland with recreational desirability, but without the right for potential residential 
development. He concluded that these sales indicated a value for the unbuildable portion of the property to be 
$500,000. In this analysis, Mr Hales indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and only the one-
acre, used by the County as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of conservation easements he relied 
on six sales and concluded that the right to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would 
represent approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be allocated to the unbuildable 
agricultural and recreational land In his reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the 
total value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to the agricultural land 
- 1 0 -
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28. Upon review of all the evidence in this matter, the Commission concludes that prior to 
designation of the 10-acre building envelope, as evidenced by the issuance of a building permit, there would be 
no distinction in value from one acre to the next for the 160 acre parcels, as the right to build was attached to 
the value of the entire lot as a whole and each acre up to the 160 acres contributed equally to the value. 
29. However, once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, the value is no longer 
equallv contributed on a per acre basis. All development and improvement must be limited to the ten acres. 
The right to build attaches to the building envelope. Furthermore, the restrictions of the conservation easement 
are then attached to the now identifiable 150 acres. The owner may no longer build fences, roadways, corrals, 
swimming pools, manmade ponds or gardens on the 150 acres. Once the building envelope has been 
established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre building envelope and the remainder of 
the property, a difference that does impact how these two portions of property- contribute to the value. 
30. Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately from the 
159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express language 
of the FAA. Mr. Hales was the only party who attempted to do this in a manner that reflects the reality that the 
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation easement. Absent 
evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales 
conclusion that 65% of the value of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land. 
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is ten-acres From a review of Mr. 
Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre building site and that of the other vv itnesses 
describing the potential for the 10-acre envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable 
portion applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home site. Nine of the 
ten buildable acres as of the lien date were still being used for agricultural purposes and one acre must be 
ooGoe* 
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valued as the home site according to statute As far as allocating a portion of the 65% to the one-acre, the 
Commission is unable to further determine which portion of the value is attributable to each acre, other than 
using 1 ;10 of the 65% of the total market value. 
31. Mr. Cook has appraised each individual lot at issue in this appeal to determine a total value as 
of the January 1, 2006 lien date. The County's assessments for 2006 were not always consistent with Mr. 
Cook's conclusions. The County did not substantially refute Mr. Cook's total values for each lot, and the 
County did not submit an appraisal of each lot. For tax year 2006, the Commission accepts Mr. Cook's total 
lot v alue for the land portion of each of the subject properties. The Commission finds the value of the 10- acre 
building envelope to be 65% of the total lot value, and the one-acre home site value to be U10 of the 65% 
attributed to the building envelope. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the 
basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provide by law. (2) Beginning January 
1, 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential 
exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
103.) 
2. ''Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market \ alue" shall be determined 
using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable 
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the change 
would have an appreciable influence upon the value. (Utah Code Sec 59-2-102(12).) 
-
12
" 0 0 G 0 6 5 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504. 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508. 06-1509 & 06-1510 
3. For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the value that the land 
has for agricultural use if the land: (a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area. . . and (b) except as 
provided in Subsection )5): (i) is actively devoted to agricultural use: and (ii) has been actively devoted to 
agricultural use for at least two successive years immediately preceding the ta,x year for vvhich the land is being 
assessed under this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-503(1).) 
4. All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on 
which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with the farmhoUse. shall be valued, assessed, and 
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land 
in the county. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507(2).) 
5. (2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the fair market 
value assessment shall be included on the notices described in (a) Subsection 59-2-919(4); and (b) Section 59-
2-1317. (3)The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value and fair market value 
assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-505 (2)&(3).) 
6. Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5 or Section 59-2-511, if land is 
withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a roll back tax imposed in accordance with this section. (Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-506(1).) 
7. The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by computing the 
difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) between: (i) the tax paid wile the land was 
assessed under this part; and (ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed under 
this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506(3).) 
8. Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization concerning the 
assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any exemption in which the person has an 
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interest. may appeal that decision to the commission b> filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the 
appeal with the county auditor vvithm 30 days after the final action of the county board. (Utah Code Sec 59-2-
1006(1).) 
9. (2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to a minimum 
parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as part of the assessment: (a) that the parcel of 
property may not be subdivided into parcels of property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and (b) any 
effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the parcel of property. (3) This section does not 
prohibit a county assessor from including as part of an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of 
property any other factor affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2(2) & (3).) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner has raised two separate but related issues. The first is whether the value of a home 
site contained within a larger and unsubdividable property may be retroactrvely established at the time of 
assessment of a rollback tax. The second is the fair market value of the existing home site for purposes of 
determining the current year's property tax assessment. To begin, a determination of the rollback tax presents 
issues of both fact and law to the Commission. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506 the amount of the 
rollback tax is computed by taking the difference between the tax paid during the roll back period based on its 
agricultural use under the FAA and the tax that would have been paid annually based on an a fair market value 
assessment. For each year of the rollback period, the County on an annual basis had already determined the 
fair market value for the subject property Furthermore, the County was required to list the fair market value 
on the Tax Valuation Notices as they were issued each year If Petitioners were in disagreement with the 
market value set by the County. Petitioners* recourse was to appeal the market value each year as provided in 
- 1 4 -
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Sec. 59-2-1001. Therefore, the total fair market value for each properly at issue for the rollback years was 
already established b\ the County pursuant to the annual notices they issued that were not appealed and may 
not now be challenged by either party based on the circumstances in this matter. 
2. Respondent's witnesses acknowledged, and it was supported by the exhibits and testimonv of 
Petitioners* witnesses, that when the County listed the fair market value on the annual notices mailed out for 
the years subject to the rollback, it listed only a total value for the entire 160-acre parcel without any breakout 
for home site land. Petitioners did not file annual appeals regarding the total market value indicated on the 
notices for each of the rollback years. Petitioners were not given the opportunity to challenge the County's 
allocation of the total market value to the home site acre, because they were never given notice of what that 
amount was. Had Petitioners been notified of the allocation to the home site acre, and that it was an amount 
different from a 1/160 allocation of the total value, Petitioners may have appealed the value on annual basis as 
is provided in the statute at Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. 
3. Furthermore, the Commission notes that for rollback purposes, valuation is based on the 
property, as it existed during the rollback period. Valuation is not based on the condition of the property that 
results after a portion has been withdrawn from greenbelt. The Commission finds that if the County valued the 
home site at a higher rate during the rollback years, the County should have indicated so annually on its 
valuation notices as they were issued for each of those years, so that the home site value could have been 
appealed annually pursuant to Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. Failure to do so alone is sufficient 
for the Commission to find that rollback tax is limited to 1/160th2 of the total value listed by the County each 
year in its valuation notices issued to Petitioners. Additionally, this legal basis is supported by the 
Commission's factual conclusion that during the rollback period, there were no designated building envelopes 
2 For Lot 46 which was 134 acres the rollback tax must be based on 1 184" of the total value 
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or home sites and, therefore, each one of the 160 acres was as valuable as the rest Prior to the issuance of the 
building permit there would have been no basis for the County to determine the one-acre home site upon which 
the residence would be located. 
4. With respect to the second issue, the question of the current home site value, it is the 
Commission's conclusion that the issue of determining the market value of the one-acre home site for the 2006 
lien date presents both legal and factual issues. Petitioners' witness. Dr. Thomas, argued that a market value 
could not be determined for the one acre as it could not be legally separated. Petitioners also argue that Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-301.2 regarding minimum parcel size supports their contention. Although the one-acre home 
site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair 
market value and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in connection with 
greenbelt property. Subsection 507(2) provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection with the 
farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to 
other taxable land and structures in the County. However, the subsection does not provide specific guidance 
on how to make that determination when the home site is part of an unsubdividable lot. Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2 does prohibit the County from valuing the 160-acre subject parcels as if they were subdividable into 
numerous single-family residential lots. The County has not valued this property as if higher density was 
allowed. Furthermore, subsection 59-2-301.2 (3) expressly provides that the County Assessor may include as 
part of the assessment other factors affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. Finally, the fact 
that Mr. Cook's valuations differ based on specific property characteristics, in addition to size, implicitly 
demonstrates that the value of any given unit of land may vary from another within each lot 
5. The Commission finds that each acre of the 160- acre parcel contributes to value. Prior to the 
designation of the building envelope this was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable envelope was 
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designated, as had occurred for all properties subject to this appeal by the 2006 lien date, there are two distinct 
and identifiable classes of property, the 10 acre building envelope and the remaining undevelopable area 
covered b> the conservation easement. These two areas do not contribute equallv to the value Respondent has 
offered an appraisal that makes a distinction. Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the 
analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable with the possibility of a second home, 
garages, barns, outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the building site, 
the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis 
adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable envelope for these properties. 
6. As of the lien date, only one acre of the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from 
greenbelt for each of these properties. As additional improvements are made in the buildable envelope, 
additional acreage may be withdrawn and rollback assessed. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the County is to calculate the 
rollback taxes for each of the properties for each rollback year based on the market value for the home site acre 
being 1'160th or 1/184th' depending on the size of the lot, of the total value indicated for that vear on the tax 
notices issued by the County. The County is to calculate the fair market value of the home site acre for the 
2006 tax vear for each parcel at issue on the basis of 65% of the total value of the lot as determined in the Cook 
appraisal div ided by 10. It is so ordered The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as 
appropriate in compliance with this order. 
DATED this / da> of C ^ ^ ^ t J ^ 2008 
^(yvil pWv—-
Jarfe Phan ' 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE T.AX COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this / day of L ^ & 4 ^ ^ 2008. 
D 
Pam Hendnckson 
Commission Chai 
Marc B. Johns 
Commissioner 
EXCUSED 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
DVZooi/Vt 
D'Arcy Dixon PigQ&felli 
Commissioner 
,^ rv 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec 63-46b-13. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newl\ discovered evidence or a mistake of lav. or fact. If you do not 
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have 
thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code 
Sec. 59-1-601 et seq and 63-46b-13 et seq. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Utah Code Section 59-1-610. Standard of review of appellate court. 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the 
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, 
applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court. 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
EXHIBIT 3 
Utah Section Code 59-2-102 (Superseded 01/01/09). Definitions. 
(12) "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to 
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For 
purposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined using the current 
zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is 
a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in 
the tax year in question and the change would have an appreciable influence upon 
the value. 
EXHIBIT 4 
Utah Code Section 59-2-507. Land included as agricultural -- Site of 
farmhouse excluded -Taxation of structures and site of farmhouse. 
(1) Land under barns, sheds, silos, cribs, greenhouses and like structures, 
lakes, dams, ponds, streams, and irrigation ditches and like facilities is included in 
determining the total area of land actively devoted to agricultural use. Land which 
is under the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is 
excluded from that determination. 
(2) All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse 
and the land on which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with 
the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, 
methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land in 
the county. 
EXHIBIT 5 
this is the only logical and fair way to divide the property. Other divisions might be suggested; 
however, those divisions frequently would benefit one party or another by complicating the 
process and making it difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the value of the building site. 
The following chart illustrates my division of the building site and the agricultural land. Please 
note that 1 have included a division for both the physical and legal aspects of the property. 
DIVISION OF WOLF CREEK LOT 
[Building Site 
1 Greenbelt Land 
Physical Division 
1 Acre 
159 Acres 
Legal Division || 
Right to build residence II 
Right to graze, hunt, and recreate 
In theory, any division of the property should create two separate parcels whose combined 
value would equal the value of the larger parcel before the division. In my opinion, the best 
method to estimate the value of the two parcels is to estimate the value of the overall property 
(160-acre lot) and then allocate the value between the one-acre building site and the rest of the 
land. Using this method of allocation would ensure that the property owner was not overtaxed or 
undertaxed. This method of valuation is a common procedure used by assessors all over the 
state. For example, an assessor estimating the value of a motel will frequently rely exclusively 
on the income approach. However, the income approach estimates the overall value of the 
property. Most appraisers will allocate the value between three major components that give 
value to the hotel. Those three components include personal property (or FFE), land, and the 
building. The assessor will frequently estimate the value of the personal property or take that 
information from the declarations by the property owner. Finally, the appraiser will estimate the 
value of the site. The balance of the value will be allocated to the building. This method of 
allocation is frequently used to break out the difference values of the component parts of the 
property. In my opinion, this is the method which should be used to estimate the value of the 
one-acre building site on the subject property. 
The overall value of the subject property has already been estimated in the previous section. At 
this point in the appraisal, we must provide an allocation of value between the one-acre building 
01346 rpt 
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site (with all rights to build) versus 159 acres of land with rights to graze, hunt, and recreate. 
There are several methods that can be used to help estimate this allocation. The first method 
would be to estimate the value of a highly desirable building site with excellent amenities and 
very high desirability. This approach could be pursued by accumulating sates of desirable one-
acre recreational lots and using them as comparables to estimate a reasonable value for the 
subject site. This method is not perfect. There are no one-acre building sites available for sale 
in the Wolf Creek project. However, if a buyer could purchase a single one-acre building site in 
the subject's exclusive neighborhood, it is likely that it would sell for a very high price. Since 
there are no sales in the subdivision, the appraiser would have to extend his search into other 
exclusive neighborhoods which have desirable amenities. These neighborhoods would likely 
include some of the more exclusive neighborhoods in Heber, Midway, and the Park City area. 
Making adjustments to lots in different exclusive neighborhoods can be very difficult. 
A second possible method would be to estimate the value of the range land with recreational 
desirability but without the rights or potential for residential development. The 159 acres could 
be valued using large acreage comparables, and the difference between this value and the 
subject's overall value would be allocated to the building site. Once again, this method is 
reasonable but it has some drawbacks. It is very difficult to find recreational land in the subject 
neighborhood that has no potential for construction of even a single homesite. Fortunately, t 
was able to find a sale that fits these parameters. 
Finally, a third method that can help the appraiser to allocate value is an analysis of 
conservation easements. Conservation easements are purchased by people, associations, and 
government entities. These easements most frequently strip the land of its development rights 
and only leave the agricultural and recreational rights to the property owner. The cost of this 
type of easement (or the cost of buying the development rights off the property) can give a 
good indication of the value that the building site contributes to the subject property. Making 
direct comparisons would be almost impossible because of the differences in location and 
desirability. However, by considering percentages of value, we can make a reasonable estimate 
of value for the building rights and the remaining land. 
3*346 rot 
The Appraisers, inc 30 Wolf Creek Ranches Wasatcrt County Attorney 
EXHIBIT 6 
placed, erected, a'tered, or permitted to remain on any Parcel other than one (1) primary single" 
family Dwelling, one (1) caretaker dwelling and one (1) garage together with related 
nonresidential Improvements which have been approved by ttje Architectural/Technical 
Committee At the time of construction of the primary single family Dwelling on any Parcel, 
said Parcel must also be improved with a garage with at least a two (2) car capacity. Whenever 
possible, the garage doors will not face towards Lhe main access road or the main view corridor 
frcm other Owner's homesites. A garage must be provided for each owned vehicle. One (1) 
caretaker dwelling may be constructed on each Parcel, provided that the size and location and all 
aspects of such caretaker dwelling are approved by the Architectural/Technical Committee and., 
provcled rurther, th.it lhe applicable zoning and building ordinances of any governmental entity 
ha\ ng aMihjnty with respect to the Property permits the construction of a caretaker dwelling. In 
no e,er, Snail the caretaker dwelling on any Parcel have a Floor .Area in excess of 2,000 square 
feet The caretaker dwelling shall USQ Lhe same driveway access used by uhe primary singlc-
famil) Dwelling on such Parcel The distance between the caretaker dwelling and the primary 
smgie-family Dwelling on each Parcel shall be no greater than 300 fe$t. 
EXHIBIT 7 
Utah Constitution - Article XIII, Section 6. [State Tax Commission.] 
(1) There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not 
more than two of whom may belong to the same political party. 
(2) With the consent of the Senate, the Governor shall appoint the members 
of the State Tax Commission for such terms as may be provided by statute. 
(3) The State Tax Commission shall: 
(a) administer and supervise the State's tax laws; 
(b) assess mines and public utilities and have such other powers of original 
assessment as the Legislature may provide by statute; 
(c) adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of property among the 
counties; 
(d) as the Legislature provides by statute, review proposed bond issues, 
revise local tax levies, and equalize the assessment and valuation of property 
within the counties; and 
(e) have other powers as may be provided by statute. 
(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in this 
Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize any court established 
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter 
decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and taxation. 
Utah Code Section 58-56-4. Definitions - Adoption of building codes -
Amendments - Approval of other codes - Exemptions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "agricultural use" means a use that relates to the tilling of soil and raising 
of crops, or keeping or raising domestic animals; 
(b) "not for human occupancy" means use of a structure for purposes other 
than protection or comfort of human beings, but allows people to enter the 
structure for: 
(i) maintenance and repair; and 
(ii) the care of livestock, crops, or equipment intended for agricultural use 
which are kept there; and 
(c) "residential area" means land that is not used for an agricultural use and 
is: 
(i) (A) within the boundaries of a city or town; and 
(B) less than five contiguous acres; 
(ii) (A) within a subdivision for which the county has approved a subdivision 
plat under Title 17, Chapter 27a, Part 6, Subdivisions; and 
(B) less than two contiguous acres; or 
(iii) not located in whole or in part in an agricultural protection area created 
under Title 17, Chapter 41, Agriculture Protection Area. 
(2) (a) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (4) and (5), the following 
codes, each of which must be promulgated by a nationally recognized code 
authority, shall be adopted, in the manner described in Subsection (2)(b), as the 
construction codes which the state and each political subdivision of the state 
shall follow in the circumstances described in Subsection (3): 
(i) a building code; 
(ii) the National Electrical Code promulgated by the National Fire Protection 
Association; 
(iii) a residential one and two family dwelling code; 
(iv) a plumbing code; 
(v) a mechanical code; 
(vi) a fuel gas code; 
(vii) an energy conservation code; and 
(viii) a manufactured housing installation standard code. 
(b) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act, the division, in collaboration with the commission, shall adopt by rule specific 
editions of the codes described in Subsection (2)(a), and may adopt by rule 
successor editions of any adopted code. 
(c)The division, in collaboration with the commission, may, in accordance 
with Section 58-56-7, adopt amendments to the codes adopted under Subsection 
(2)(a), to be applicable to the entire state or within one or more political 
subdivisions. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (4) and (5), the codes and 
amendments adopted under Subsection (2) shall be followed when: 
(a) new construction is involved; 
(b) the owner of an existing building, or the owner's agent, is voluntarily 
engaged in: 
(i) the repair, renovation, remodeling, alteration, enlargement, rehabilitation, 
conservation, or reconstruction of the building; or 
(ii) changing the character or use of the building in a manner which increases 
the occupancy loads, other demands, or safety risks of the building. 
(4) (a) The division, in collaboration with the commission, has discretion to 
approve, without adopting, certain codes in addition to those described in 
Subsection (2)(a), including specific editions of the codes, for use by a 
compliance agency. 
(b) If the applicable code is one which the division has approved under 
Subsection (4)(a), a compliance agency has the discretion to: 
(i) adopt an ordinance requiring removal, demolition, or repair of a building, 
according to a code; 
(ii) adopt, by ordinance or rule, a dangerous building code; or 
(iii) adopt, by ordinance or rule, a building rehabilitation code. 
(5) (a) Except in a residential area, a structure used solely in conjunction with 
agriculture use, and not for human occupancy, is exempted from the permit 
requirements of any code adopted by the division. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), unless otherwise exempted, plumbing, 
electrical, and mechanical permits may be required when that work is included in 
the structure. 
Utah Code Section 59-1-602. Right to appeal -- Venue -- County as party in 
interest. 
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county whose 
tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's option petition for 
judicial review in the district court pursuant to this section, or in the Supreme 
Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 59-1-610. 
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in the district 
is in the district court located in the county of residence or principal place of 
business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are 
assessed on a statewide basis, to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County. 
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review made to the 
district court under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being reviewed 
shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the court. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-301.2. Definitions -- Assessment of property 
subject to a minimum parcel size -- Other factors affecting fair market 
value. 
(1) "Minimum parcel size" means the minimum size that a parcel of property 
may be divided into under a zoning ordinance adopted by a: 
(a) county in accordance with Title 17, Chapter 27a, Part 5, Land Use 
Ordinances; or 
(b) city or town in accordance with Title 10, Chapter 9a, Part 5, Land Use 
Ordinances. 
(2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to 
a minimum parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as 
part of the assessment: 
(a) that the parcel of property may not be subdivided into parcels of property 
smaller than the minimum parcel size; and 
(b) any effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the 
parcel of property. 
(3) This section does not prohibit a county assessor from including as part of 
an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of property any other factor 
affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-505. Indicia of value for agricultural use 
assessment -- Inclusion of fair market value on certain property tax notices. 
(1) (a) The county assessor shall consider only those indicia of value that the 
land has for agricultural use as determined by the commission when assessing 
land: 
(i) that meets the requirements of Section 59-2-503 to be assessed under this 
part; and 
(ii) for which the owner has: 
(A) made a timely application in accordance with Section 59-2-508 for 
assessment under this part for the tax year for which the land is being assessed; 
and 
(B) obtained approval of the application described in Subsection (1)(a)(ii)(A) 
from the county assessor. 
(b) If land that becomes subject to a conservation easement created in 
accordance with Title 57, Chapter 18, Land Conservation Easement Act, meets 
the requirements of Subsection (1)(a) for assessment under this part, the county 
assessor shall consider only those indicia of value that the land has for 
agricultural use in accordance with Subsection (1)(a) when assessing the land. 
(2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the 
fair market value assessment shall be included on the notices described in: 
(a) Section 59-2-919.1; and 
(b) Section 59-2-1317. 
(3) The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value 
and fair market value assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-
1001. 
Utah Code Section 59-2-506. Rollback tax -- Penalty - Computation of tax --
Procedure -- Lien - Interest -- Notice -- Collection - Distribution - Appeal to 
county board of equalization. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5, or Section 59-2-511, 
if land is withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a rollback tax imposed in 
accordance with this section. 
(2) (a) An owner shall notify the county assessor that land is withdrawn from 
this part within 120 days after the day on which the land is withdrawn from this 
part. 
(b) An owner that fails to notify the county assessor under Subsection (2)(a) 
that land is withdrawn from this part is subject to a penalty equal to the greater of: 
(i) $10; or 
(ii) 2% of the rollback tax due for the last year of the rollback period. 
(3) (a) The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by 
computing the difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) 
between: 
(i) the tax paid while the land was assessed under this part; and 
(ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed 
under this part. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the rollback period is a time period that: 
(i) begins on the later of: 
(A) the date the land is first assessed under this part; 6r 
(B) five years preceding the day on which the county assessor mails the notice 
required by Subsection (5); and 
(ii) ends the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by 
Subsection (5). 
(4) (a) The county treasurer shall: 
(i) collect the rollback tax; and 
(ii) after the rollback tax is paid, certify to the county recorder that the rollback 
tax lien on the property has been satisfied by: 
(A) preparing a document that certifies that the rollback tax lien on the property 
has been satisfied; and 
(B) providing the document described in Subsection (4)(a)(ii)(A) to the county 
recorder for recordation. 
(b) The rollback tax collected under this section shall: 
(i) be paid into the county treasury; and 
(ii) be paid by the county treasurer to the various taxing entities pro rata in 
accordance with the property tax levies for the current year. 
(5) (a) The county assessor shall mail to an owner of the land that is subject to 
a rollback tax a notice that: 
(i) the land is withdrawn from this part; 
(ii) the land is subject to a rollback tax under this section; and 
(iii) the rollback tax is delinquent if the owner of the land does not pay the tax 
within 30 days after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice. 
(b) (i) The rollback tax is due and payable on the day the county assessor mails 
the notice required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(ii) Subject to Subsection (7), the rollback tax is delinquent if an owner of the 
land that is withdrawn from this part does not pay the rollback tax within 30 days 
after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by 
Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) (a) Subject to Subsection (6)(b), the following are a lien on the land 
assessed under this part: 
(i) the rollback tax; and 
(ii) interest imposed in accordance with Subsection (7). 
(b) The lien described in Subsection (6)(a) shall: 
(i) arise upon the imposition of the rollback tax under this section; 
(ii) end on the day on which the rollback tax and interest imposed in 
accordance with Subsection (7) are paid in full; and 
(iii) relate back to the first day of the rollback period described in Subsection 
(3)(b). 
(7) (a) A delinquent rollback tax under this section shall accrue interest: 
(i) from the date of delinquency until paid; and 
(ii) at the interest rate established under Section 59-2-1331 and in effect on 
January 1 of the year in which the delinquency occurs. 
(b) A rollback tax that is delinquent on September 1 of any year shall be 
included on the notice required by Section 59-2-1317, along with interest 
calculated on that delinquent amount through November 30 of the year in which 
the notice under Section 59-2-1317 is mailed. 
(8) (a) Land that becomes ineligible for assessment under this part, only as a 
result of an amendment to this part is not subject to the rollback tax if the owner of 
the land notifies the county assessor that the land is withdrawn from this part in 
accordance with Subsection (2). 
(b) Land described in Subsection (8)(a) that is withdrawn from this part as a 
result of an event other than an amendment to this part, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, is subject to the rollback tax. 
(9) Except as provided in Section 59-2-511, land that becomes exempt from 
taxation under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 3, is not subject to the 
rollback tax if the land meets the requirements of Section 59-2-503 to be assessed 
under this part. 
(10) (a) Subject to Subsection (10)(b), an owner of land may appeal to the 
county board of equalization: 
(i) a decision by a county assessor to withdraw land from assessment under 
this part; or 
(ii) the imposition of a rollback tax under this section. 
(b) An owner shall file an appeal under Subsection (10)(a) no later than 45 
days after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by 
Subsection (5). 
Utah Code Section 59-2-510. Separation of land. 
Separation of a part of the land which is being valued, assessed, and taxed 
under this part, either by conveyance or other action of the owner of the land, for a 
use other than agricultural, subjects the land which is separated to liability for the 
applicable rollback tax, but does not impair the continuance of agricultural use 
valuation, assessment, and taxation for the remaining land if it continues to meet 
the requirements of this part. 
Utah Code Section 63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of App63als has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all 
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, 
or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for 
the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(Hi) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Section 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, 
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 42. Transfer of case from supreme 
court to court of appeals. 
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to transfer. At any time before a case is set for oral 
argument before the Supreme Court, the Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any 
case except those cases within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The order of 
transfer shall be issued without opinion, written or oral, as to the merits of the appeal or 
the reasons for the transfer. 
(b) Notice of order of transfer. Upon entry of the order of transfer the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court shall give notice of entry of the order of transfer by mail to each party to 
the proceeding and to the clerk of the trial court. Upon entry of the order of transfer, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transfer the original of the order and the case, including 
the record and file of the case from the trial court, all papers filed in the Supreme Court, 
and a written statement of all docket entries in the case up to and including the order of 
transfer, to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. 
(c) Receipt of order of transfer by Court of Appeals. Upon receipt of the original order of 
transfer from the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall 
enter the appeal upon the Court of Appeals docket. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall immediately give notice to each party to the proceeding and to the clerk of the trial 
court that the appeal has been docketed and that all further filings will be made with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals. The notice shall state the docket number assigned to the 
case in the Court of Appeals. 
(d) Filing or transfer of appeal record. If the record on appeal has not been filed with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court shall notify the clerk of the trial court that upon completion of the 
conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the record on appeal 
to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. If, however, the record on appeal has already been 
transmitted to and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as of the date of the entry of 
the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit the record on appeal 
to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within five days of the date of the entry of the order 
of transfer. 
(e) Subsequent proceedings before Court of Appeals. Upon receipt by the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals of the order of transfer and the entry thereof upon the docket of the 
Court of Appeals, the case shall proceed before the Court of Appeals to final decision and 
disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these rules. 
(f) Finality of order of transfer. An order of transfer, when entered by the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, is final and shall be subject to reconsideration only in the Supreme Court 
and only on jurisdictional grounds. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Former Rules 4A and 4B have been renumbered as Rules 42 and 43 respectively and 
included in a new title governing the certification and transfer of cases between courts. 
The amendments make uniform the practices followed by the two appellate courts in 
transferring cases. 
